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Abstract. Robert Griffiths has recently addressed, within the framework of a 
‘consistent quantum theory’ that he has developed, the issue of whether, as 
is often claimed, quantum mechanics entails a need for faster-than-light 
transfers of information over long distances. He argues that the putative 
proofs of this property that involve hidden variables include in their 
premises some essentially classical-physics-type assumptions that are 
fundamentally incompatible with the precepts of quantum physics. One 
cannot logically prove properties of a system by establishing, instead, 
properties of a system modified by adding properties alien to the original 
system. Hence Griffiths’ rejection of hidden-variable-based proofs is 
logically warranted. Griffiths mentions the existence of a certain alternative 
proof that does not involve hidden variables, and that uses only 
macroscopically described observable properties. He notes that he had 
examined in his book proofs of this general kind, and concluded that they 
provide no evidence for nonlocal influences. But he did not examine the 
particular proof that he cites. An examination of that particular proof by the 
method specified by his ‘consistent quantum theory’ shows that the cited 
proof is valid within that restrictive version of quantum theory. An added 
section responds to Griffiths’ reply, which cites general possibilities of 
ambiguities that make what is to be proved ill-defined, and hence render the 
pertinent ‘consistent framework’ ill defined. But the vagaries that he cites do 
not upset the proof in question, which, both by its physical formulation and 
by explicit identification, specify the framework to be used. Griffiths 
confirms the validity of the proof insofar as that framework is used. The 
section also shows, in response to Griffiths’ challenge, why a putative proof 
of locality that he has described is flawed. 
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                                 INTRODUCTION 
 
Robert Griffiths begins his recent paper Quantum Locality [1] with the 
observation that “The opinion is widespread that quantum mechanics is 
nonlocal in the sense that it implies the existence of long range influences 
which act instantaneously over long distances, in apparent contradiction to 
special relativity”.  He says that the purpose of his paper “is to move beyond 
previous discussions by employing a fully consistent quantum mechanical 
approach” to “argue that the supposed nonlocal influences do not exist” and 
to “establish on the basis of quantum principles a strong statement of 
quantum locality: the objective properties of an isolated individual 
(quantum) system do not change when something is done to another non-
interacting system.”  
 
Griffiths’ claims, if valid, would constitute an extremely important 
achievement: it is difficult to find an issue as central to our understanding of 
nature as the question of whether or not far-flung parts of the universe are 
tied together by long-range faster-than-light transfers of information . 
 
Almost all of Griffiths’ paper is directed against arguments for nonlocality 
that are based on the concept of hidden variables: the paper is directed 
primarily against arguments that have stemmed directly from the works of 
John Bell pertaining to local deterministic and local stochastic hidden-
variable theories. However, the local stochastic hidden-variable theories 
have been shown by Stapp [2], and also by Fine[3], to be essentially 
equivalent to local deterministic hidden-variable theories. But these latter 
theories are theories of an essentially classical-physics type, with statistically 
distributed unobservable hidden variables. Such theories could include 
Bohm’s pilot-wave model if it were stripped of its nonlocal-interaction 
feature, which is, however, essential to its structure and its success, 
particularly in applications to the EPR-type correlation experiments that are 
the basis of the arguments for nonlocal influences.  
 
In view of this basically classical character of the hidden-variable theories, it 
is obviously going to be extremely difficult to deduce, in any logically sound 
way, the properties of a quantum-mechanical world from the properties of 
hidden-variable models: How can one pass, logically, from fact that one 
needs to add nonlocal influences to any essentially classical model, in order 
to fit the quantum predictions, to conclusions about the quantum mechanical 
universe itself? The logical difficulty in deriving such a conclusion is that 
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the hidden-variable premises contain classical reality assumptions that are 
incompatible with basic quantum concepts. In view of this basic logical 
problem, it is clear that a search for a strictly rational proof of the existence 
within the quantum universe of nonlocal influences should focus on 
arguments that do not use hidden variables; arguments that are not based on 
the failure of local hidden-variable theories! Griffiths nevertheless confines 
his attention mainly to arguments for nonlocality based on the failure of 
local hidden-variable theories. 
 
Commenting upon this severe curtailment of the scope of his arguments 
Griffiths laments that “In an argument of modest length it is impossible to 
deal with all the published arguments that quantum theory is beset with 
nonlocal influences… In particular we do not deal with …Stapp’s 
counterfactual arguments.  …the problems associated with importing 
counterfactual reasoning into the quantum domain are treated in some detail 
in Ch. 19  of [4], and the conclusion is the same: there is no evidence for 
them.”  
 
In this paper I shall show that the methods that Griffiths developed lead, 
rather, to the opposite conclusion. His “fully consistent quantum approach” 
validates the counterfactual argument that he cites, but does not analyze. The 
validated nonlocal influence required by the assumed validity of certain 
predictions of quantum theory is fully concordant with the basic principles 
of relativistic quantum field theory, which ensure that the phenomena 
covered by the theory can neither reveal a preferred frame associated with 
these influences, nor allow “signals” (sender-controlled information) to 
propagate faster than the speed of light. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                   COUNTERFACTUALS IN PHYSICS 
 
The word “counterfactual” engenders in the minds of minds of most 
physicists a feeling of deep suspicion. This wariness is appropriate because 
counterfactuals, misused, can lead to all sorts of nonsense. On the other 
hand, all arguments for the need, in a universe in which the predictions of 
quantum mechanics hold, for some faster-than-light transfer of information 
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requires considering in a single logical analysis the predictions of quantum 
theory associated with (at least) four alternative possible measurements. 
Probably the only logically sound way to do this, without bringing in 
hidden-variables, is to use counterfactuals. This can be done in a completely 
logical and rational way. Indeed, Griffiths takes pains to show how valid 
counterfactual reasoning is to be pursued and validated within his 
“consistent quantum theory”. His conclusion pertaining to the validation of 
counterfactual reasoning is the basis of the present work. 
 
Griffiths begins his discussion of counterfactuals [4, p. 262] by noting that 
“Unfortunately, philosophers and logicians have yet to reach agreement 
about what constitutes valid counterfactual reasoning in the classical 
domain.” It is certainly true that philosophers fall into disputes when trying 
to formulate general rules that cover all of the conceivable counterfactual 
situations that they can imagine, in a classical-physics, and hence 
deterministic, setting. But such a setting is strictly incompatible with the 
notion of “free choices” that underlies the idea of alternative possibilities. 
But what will be examined here is only a very simple special case, one in 
which the quantum mechanical laws (predictions) themselves specify all that 
we need to know about the outcomes of the contemplated measurements, 
and in which alternatives arising from alternative possible choices become 
theoretically possible because of the allowed entry of elements of chance 
into the dynamics of the choices of which measurements will be performed.  
 
As a brief introduction to the subject of counterfactual statements, consider 
the following simple classical example: Suppose an electron that is moving 
in some fixed direction with definite but unknown speed is shot into a region 
in which there is an electric field E that is known to be uniform at one or the 
other of two known values, E1 or E2, with E2 twice E1. And suppose two 
detectors, D1 and D2, are placed so that one can assert, on the basis of the 
known laws of classical electromagnetism, that “If E is E1 and detector D1 
clicks, then if, instead, E is E2, the detector D2 would have clicked.”  Under 
the appropriate physical conditions this can be a valid theoretical assertion, 
even though it cannot be empirically verified, since one can not actually 
perform both of the contemplated alternative possible experiments. But the 
postulated physical laws allow one to infer from knowledge of what happens 
in a certain performed experiment what would have happened if, instead, an 
alternative possible measurement had been performed, all else being the 
same. The concept “if, instead,” becomes pertinent in a quantum context in 
which this choice between E1 and E2 is controlled by whether a certain 
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quantum detection device “clicks” or not. This choice of which measurement 
is performed is then not determined by the quantum mechanical laws, but 
enters as a “random” variable. 
  
Consider in this light the following formulation of a putative argument for 
the need for faster-than-light transmission of information. 
 
Suppose in each of two space-like separated regions, L and R , with L earlier 
than R (in some frame) there will be performed one or the other of two 
alternative possible measurements, with each measurement having two 
alternative possible outcomes. The choices between alternative possible 
measurements are to be specified in way that can be considered, within the 
quantum framework, to be “free choices”: they are not specified by any 
known law or rule.  The question at issue is whether, under these conditions, 
it is possible to satisfy the orthodox predictions of quantum mechanics in the 
four alternative possible measurement situations, without allowing 
information about the free choice made in either region to be present in the 
other region.  
 
Notice that the only things that enter the argument are the random choices of 
which macroscopically described measurement is performed in each region, 
and the predictions of the theory about which macroscopically described 
outcomes then appear. No microscopic quantities or properties enter into the 
argument.  
 
 
         GRIFFITHS’ CONSISTENT QUANTUM THEORY   
 
The proof in question of the need for faster-than-light transfer of information 
was given in [5], and repeated in the last two pages of [6].  But the purpose 
of this paper is not to recall old results. It is rather to comment upon 
Griffiths’ “consistent quantum theory” approach, which has attracted interest 
due to references to it by Murray Gell-Mann and Jim Hartle (who, in 
contrast to Griffiths, use it in a “Many-Worlds” context), and in particular to 
show that the counterfactual argument cited but not analyzed by Griffiths is, 
contrary to Griffiths’ implicit claim, validated within his “consistent 
quantum theory” framework, as currently defined. This validation of the 
need for faster-than-light transmission of information within the “consistent 
quantum theory” framework constitutes a serious failing of that approach, 
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insofar as it claims to be superior to the von Neumann approach because it 
does not lead to nonlocal influences.  
 
I begin by describing Griffiths’ general theory and its relationship to the 
orthodox quantum theory of von Neumann, to which it is contrasted. 
, 
“Measurements” play a very important role in orthodox quantum mechanics. 
But they are not generated by the quantum evolution in accordance with the 
Schroedinger equation. The physical act of performing a measurement on a 
quantum system and getting a positive empirical outcome is represented in 
the orthodox quantum mathematics by the action a corresponding projection 
operator on the prior quantum state.  
 
Generalizing from the concept of a set alternative possible measurement 
outcomes at one single time one arrives at the concept of a “framework”, 
which involving a sequence times {t0, t1, t 2 , …, tf},  with   ti+1 > ti   and for 
each of these times ti a set of orthogonal projection operators that sum to 
unity .  
 
A “history” is a time-ordered set of (Heisenberg Picture) projection 
operators (all operating in the usual Hilbert space of the full physical 
system) with one projection operator selected from the set at each time ti . 
The different alternative possible “histories” labeled by index k (which runs 
over the set of possible histories) are mapped (by Griffiths’ chain operator) 
into operators represented by the symbols Fk. For each Fk the Hermitian 
conjugate of Fk is represented by Gk.  Let “rho” represent the initial density 
matrix. Then the set of histories is called a “consistent” if and only if Trace 
(Gg rho Fk) is zero when g is different from k. This condition is 
automatically satisfied if, as in the case to be examined here, all of the 
occurring projection operators, in context, commute. In our case, every 
nonzero Fk can be identified by a trajectory that moves from left to right on a 
temporal tree graph that starts from a single line on the far left, and ends at 
one of sixteen possible lines on the far right, with each non-final segment of 
the tree graph having a binary branching into two lines at its right-hand 
endpoint, which occurs at one of the four times ti  at which a choice (of a 
measurement or an outcome) is made. This leads to sixteen possible lines on 
the far right of the tree graph. Purely for simplicity, one can take the 
evolution between measurements to be represented by the unit operator. In 
order to allow an easy graphical check on Griffiths’ rules for validating 
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counterfactual arguments one can, and should, prune away any branches that 
are required to have zero amplitude for the Hardy initial state. 
    
Griffiths’ procedure for checking the validity of counterfactual reasoning is 
to draw a tree graph that starts at the far left with a single horizontal line that 
represents the original (in our case, Hardy) state. In our case this line 
bifurcates at time t1 into an upper branch labeled by ML1, and a lower 
branch labeled by ML2. These two branches represent the two alternative 
possible observer-selected settings of the device in the earlier region L. Then 
at time t2 the line ML1 bifurcates into an upper branch labeled by ML1+, 
and a lower branch labeled by ML1-, and the branch ML2 bifurcates in 
similar way into ML2+ and ML2-. These branches represent the two 
alternative possible states of the outcome indicator (pointer) on device ML 
set at state of readiness ML1, and, alternatively, on the device ML set at 
state of readiness ML2. At time t3, each of these four branches bifurcates  
into an upper branch MR1 and a lower branch MR2, and then at time t4 each 
of the eight branches bifurcates into a plus and a minus branch, giving one 
branch for each of the sixteen orthogonal states of the pair of apparatuses 
together with their respective pointers. This graph represents one single 
framework, within which the entire argument can be carried out, thereby 
satisfying Griffiths’ crucial “single framework rule”. Due to the 
orthogonality of the states representing the alternative possible device 
settings and of the alternative possible pointer locations in each region, and 
the orthogonality of the apparatus-pointer “outcome” states in the two 
regions L and R, Griffiths’ condition of “consistent histories”  is satisfied. 
Thus we can proceed to check Griffiths’ condition for valid counterfactual 
reasoning. 
 
The pertinent counterfactual statement has the form:  
 
SR: “If MR1 is performed and the outcome MR1+ appears, then if, instead 
of MR1, rather MR2 is performed then the outcome MR2+ must appear.” 
 
If the initial state is the Hardy state, then Hardy [7] gives four pertinent 
predictions of quantum theory:  
 
 
S1: If ML1 and MR1+, then ML1+.                                       [Hardy’s (14.a)] 
S2: If ML1+ and MR2, then MR2+                                        [Hardy’s (14.c)] 
S3: If ML2+ and MR1, then MR1+.                                       [Hardy’s (14.b)] 
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S4: If ML2+ and MR2, then sometimes MR2-.”                    [Hardy’s (14.d)] 
 
[Connection to Hardy’s notation: 
 
  Hardy’s   U1 = 0        Stapp’s  ML1+    
                  U1 = 1                      ML1- 
 
                   D1 = 0                     ML2- 
                   D1 = 1                     ML2+ 
  
                   U2 = 0                      MR1- 
                   U2 = 1                      MR1+ 
    
                    D2 = 0                      MR2+ 
                    D2 = 1                      MR2- 
 
Statement S1  follows from Hardy’s (14.a), which entails that, in the Hardy 
state, if ML1 and MR1 are performed and outcome MR1+ (U2  = 1) appears, 
then outcome  ML1+(U1 = 0) must appear---since ML1- (U1 = 1) cannot 
appear. Statement S2 follows from (14.c), [If MR2 and ML1 are performed 
and MR2 has outcome -, then ML1 must have outcome -: Use the fact that 
AB is equivalent to NotBNotA. Statement S3 is a direct translation of 
Hardy’s (14.b), and S4 follows from Hardy’s (14.d), which asserts that the 
probabability that both ML2+ (D1 = 1) and MR2- (D2 = 1)  appear is (with 
nonzero A and B) nonzero.]   
 
It is a straightforward exercise to show that if the initial state is the Hardy 
initial state, and if it is assumed that an outcome that occurs and is recorded 
in the earlier region L is left unchanged if instead of MR1 rather MR2 is 
performed later in R, then the statement SR is true if ML1 is performed in L 
but is false if ML2 is performed in L: The truth of the statement SR about 
possible happenings in R depends upon which experiment is “freely chosen” 
in the region L, which is spacelike separated from region R 
    
Griffiths’ validation of SR in the ML1 case follows from the fact that if the 
choice in L is ML1 then starting on branch MR1+, the quantum prediction 
S1 justifies the move back to the “pivot point” where ML1+ branches into 
MR1 and MR2. Then S2 justifies the move forward to MR2+.  
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But if the choice of measurement in L had been ML2 then sometimes the 
outcome ML2+ appears. But under that condition, if MR1 is chosen on the 
right, then S3 implies that the outcome on the right must be MR1+.  But in 
this case where MR1+ must appear, if, instead, MR2 is chosen in R then, 
virtue of S4, MR2+ sometimes does not appear, and we have a counter 
example to what was proved true in the case that ML1 was chosen in L. All 
parts of the argument are represented in the tree graph that corresponds to a 
“single framework”, in accordance with Griffiths very restrictive “single 
framework rule”. 
 
 
RESPONSE TO GRIFFITHS REPLY 
 
Griffiths’ CQT is based on his concept of “consistent families of histories”, 
called “frameworks”. Within any single framework the usual classical laws 
of logic hold, but different frameworks can lead to different conclusions. It 
is therefore absolutely essential to any proposed application of the CQT 
rules pertaining to counterfactuals that the statement of the theorem: (1), 
identify a suitable framework that allows the theorem to be proved true: and 
(2) rule out any framework that allows that theorem to be proved false. 
Frameworks that do not conform to the conditions of the theorem, and hence 
do not allow the theorem to be either validated or invalidated are not 
relevant to the issue of the validity of the theorem. 
 
I shall explain, in this rejoinder, why, in the above proof of nonlocality, I use 
a proper framework; and why the resulting proof settles the locality issue. 
The various evasions and ambiguities cited by Griffiths[8], which appear to 
eviscerate almost completely Griffiths’ method of validating counterfactual 
arguments, do not upset my proof: all pertinent ambiguities are removed by 
the explicitly stated conditions imposed by the statement of the theorem. The 
fact that, within a consistent formulation of plane geometry, Pythagoras’ 
Theorem might not be provable by spurious methods fraught with 
ambiguities, does not render that theorem false. Within any consistent 
formalism one correct proof of an unambiguously formulated general 
property suffices! No conflicting proof allowed by a consistent formalism 
can disprove a conclusion established by a valid proof.  
 
One nice thing about Griffiths’ reply to my paper is that he not only 
confirms that my proof is valid in the framework that I use, but he also 
actually shows the diagrams that immediately confirm almost all of what 
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needs to be proved. In particular, one can see immediately from his Fig.1a, 
which pertains to the case in which the alternative possibilities in L are 
[0]a(ML1+) and [1]a(ML1-), that if one performs  Zb (MR1) and gets Z--b 
(MR1+) then if instead of Zb (MR1) one performs Xb (MR2) then, by tracing 
back from the unique Z--b (MR1+), to the pivot point where the choice 
between Zb (MR1) and Xb (MR2) is made, and them forward along the MR2 
branch, one arrives unambiguously at X+b (MR2+). This validates, 
graphically, the first half of what needs to be proved. It confirms, within 
CQT, the same conclusion that, by using the normal logical meanings of the 
occurring words, follows unambiguously from the orthodox predictions of 
quantum theory, in a Hardy-type experiment.  
 
Most of other half is then proved by looking at Figure 1b, which pertains to 
the case in which the two alternative possible macroscopic outcomes in L 
are the states that in my proof I call ML2+ and ML2-. Figure 1b shows that 
in this case the CQM rules for validating the counter-factual statement SR 
fail: the final outcome in this second case need not be X+b (MR2+).  
 
In fact, as Griffiths notes, more can be proved: If MR1 is performed and 
MR1+ appears, then if, instead of MR1, rather MR2 is performed, then the 
probability that X+b (MR2+) appears can, by adjusting the parameters of the 
Hardy state, be made arbitrarily close to zero. Then the outcome will almost 
never be the required MP2+. Thus what was previously proved to be true in 
region R, in the case in which the apparatus randomly chosen in L is the one 
specified by ML1, would be false if the apparatus chosen in L were the one 
specified by ML2. Thus what is true in R depends on which experiment is 
(randomly) performed in L. The locality property is thereby proved to be 
false.  
 
The fact that other frameworks exist that do not conform to the conditions of 
the theorem, and hence do not allow the theorem to be proved either true or 
false, does not invalidate what was previously proved. On the other hand, if 
some CQT framework were to exist that conforms to all the conditions of the 
theorem, and allows locality to be proved true, rather than false, then the 
CQT theory would not be a consistent theory.  
 
The proof thus rests upon the fact that there is some framework in which SR 
is true with probability one or false with nonzero probability according to 
which branch is chosen at time t1 , where this choice at t1 corresponds to a 
random physical choice between two setting of the macroscopic apparatus in 
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L. This result requires the information about the choice made in L to be 
present in R, in this particular situation. This consequence of the predictions 
of quantum theory is sufficient to prove nonlocality. The fact that there are 
other frameworks that do not yield conclusions about the truth or falsity of 
the theorem in question is irrelevant to the question of the truth of that 
theorem. 
 
Griffiths notes that “As the projectors associated with Sax do not commute 
with those associated with Saz the two families in (6) and (7) are 
incompatible: the results of reasoning using one (family) cannot be 
combined with the results using the other (family): this is the single 
framework rule discussed at length in CQT.”  
 
This circumstance blocks using in one argument the results from the two 
Figures 1a  and 1b, insofar as we do not included in the analysis the two 
alternative possible apparati that translate microstates before the 
measurements into associated non-overlapping macroscopic outcomes.  
 
But the statement of the theorem demands the presence of such apparati: it 
demands the presence of measuring systems that will produce on the 
macroscopic scale outcomes that are unambiguously correlated to the 
associated microstates of the particles entering the apparati. For the two 
apparati, one can consider a Stern-Gerlach device that can be rotated so as 
“measure” either Sax or Saz .  In the first setting one has, at the macro level, 
state Za which goes to Z+a or to Z--a according to whether the incoming 
microstate is S+az or S—az , and similarly for the second setting/apparatus, 
with Z replaced by X. The four macrostates {Z+a , Z--a , X+a , X--a} are 
macroscopically well separated. This is my set {ML1+,ML1-,ML2+,ML2-}, 
which I place at time t2. I put at time t1 the pair {ML1, ML2} where ML1 
specifies the macroscopic apparatus that yields outcome ML1+ if the particle 
entering into has microstate S+az and yields ML1- if the particle entering into 
it has microstate S—az , and ML2 specifies the macroscopic apparatus that 
yields outcome ML2+ if the particle entering into has microstate S+ax  and 
yields  ML1- if the particle entering into it has microstate S—ax. Because of 
the dynamical independence of these two systems, this arrangement in L 
gives a consistent family of histories:  a single framework within which the 
entire analysis can be carried out.   
 
As Griffiths says in CQT (p. 231) “A quantum mechanical description of a 
measurement with particular outcomes must obviously employ a framework 
  
 12 
in which these outcome are represented by appropriate projectors.” Because 
the statement of my nonlocality theorem explicitly demands the presence of 
precisely these specific apparati, I am obliged to use these apparati in the 
analysis and “must obviously employ a framework in which these outcome 
are represented by appropriate projectors. “ 
 
The suggestion made by Griffiths that the counterfactual considerations of 
Sec. 19.4 of CQT be applied in L is off-target, because the logical structure 
of the argument is such that in the earlier region L the options are not 
counterfactual, but are just simple disjunctive alternatives, and the required 
disjunctive character is justified by the satisfaction of the “consistent 
histories” conditions. The counterfactual aspect of my proof is restricted to 
region R. 
 
The explicit formulation my theorem thus entitles me, and requires me, to 
use the framework that represents the particular apparati that are demanded 
by the statement of the theorem. Then the proof goes through: the truth of 
SR depends on which apparatus is (randomly) chosen in L. Hence locality is 
violated! The fact that there are frameworks that have no impact on the truth 
or falsity of the theorem is logically irrelevant.  
 
Griffiths claims that “Neither Stapp nor anyone else has yet found a defect in 
the relatively straightforward (no counterfactuals) demonstration of the 
principle of Einstein locality given in [2], a principle that directly contradicts 
Stapp’s claim of nonlocality.” 
 
Suppose, as Griffiths postulates, that the full systems in each of the two 
experimental space-time regions, A and B -- with B including the system C 
that consists of two apparati, a random number generator, and a servo-
mechanism that randomly puts in place one apparatus or the other -- do 
indeed evolve according to locally existing conditions, during the common 
measurement interval from t0 to tn , as Griffiths specifies. And suppose there 
is in each region during that interval, is a single particle from a pair of 
correlated particles, with the apparatus in each region interacting with the 
particle located in that region. Thus the time t0 must be a time such that the 
two measured particles are safely within their respective regions. Otherwise 
the dynamics will not be separable, as demanded. 
 
Overriding all else are the predictions of quantum theory pertaining to 
outcomes of the various alternative possible combinations of measurements 
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performed on the correlated particles located in two different space-time 
experimental regions, A and B.   
 
The conditions imposed in Griffiths’ putative proof in no way prevents the 
situation in region A from depending strongly upon which measurement was 
performed in region B. Griffiths’ Figures 1a and 1b, with B the region L, and 
A the region R, immediately show that the predictions of quantum 
mechanics entail that the state of affairs in A depends upon which choice of 
apparatus is made in region B.   
 
If it be asked how, in strict compliance with Griffiths’ stringent locality 
conditions, the situation in A can depend upon the actions performed in B by 
C, the simple reply is that the action performed by C on the particle in B 
influences the detection event in B, which is associated with a changes the 
state of its partner headed for, but not yet arrived at, the experimental space-
time region A.  
 
Griffiths may recoil at such a solution. But, regardless of how nature 
actually works – a matter upon which opinions differ -- this action-at-a-
distance description is compatible with how the predictions of quantum 
mechanics are actually constructed by the quantum formalism: this action is 
often construed as a backward-in-time action. Hence Griffiths’ proof does 
not work: the conditions do not strictly exclude from region A information 
about what C does in region B, in a quantum context that, evading 
ontological prejudices about how nature works, accepts the predictions of 
quantum theory as the solidly valid features of quantum mechanics upon 
which the proofs of nonlocality build.  
 
Thus Griffiths’ proposed proof of locality ignores the essential problem, 
which is that the procedure by means of which the predictions of quantum 
theory are actually calculated involves the spooky action at a distance that 
Einstein abhorred. That aspect might be completely unreal at some basic 
level, but it is an integral part of the machinery that produces the 
predictions upon which all arguments for nonlocality build.  Griffiths’ 
Figures 1a and 1b are perpetual pictorial reminders of fact that the 
correlations predicted by quantum mechanics entail, under appropriate 
conditions, that what is measured in one region affects properties in the 
other. It is of course true that the orthodox quantum rules are such that no 
“signal” can be transmitted faster than light, and this fact can buttress the 
opinion that the seeming intrusion of nonlocal effects into dynamics is 
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spurious. But it begs the question to insert that opinion into a claimed proof 
of locality.  
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